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I. INTRODUCTION

On November 28, 2010, the Law and Administration (Annulment of
the Application of the Law, Jurisdiction and Administration)
(Amendment) Law, 2010 (Referendum Law) was endorsed and published
in Reshumot (the Official Governmental Journal) by the Israeli
Parliament (Knesset), thus entered into force as a binding law.'
The law was enacted as an amendment to an earlier legislation called
"The Law and Administration (Annulment of the Application of the Law,
Jurisdiction and Administration) (Amendment) Law, 1999" (Golan
Heights Entrenchment Law), which granted the executive branch in Israel
the power to make decisions regarding the annulment of the law,
jurisdiction, and administration of the State of Israel over the Golan
Heights, together with its power to relinquish this area subject to a
binding referendum, held in accordance with a Basic Law on referendum,
to be enacted later on by the Knesset. 2 In other words, the Golan Heights
Entrenchment Law was declaratory; thus calling upon the need to
enshrine such referendum apparatus in a Basic Law enactment.
1. The Book of Laws, no. 2263 (Nov. 28, 2010).
2. The Book of Laws, no. 1703 (Feb. 9, 1999).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss2/2

2

Wattad: Israel's Laws on Referendum: A Tale of Unconstitutional Legal Str
2015]

ISRAEL'SLAWS ON REFERENDUM. A TALE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURE

215

Despite of the Knesset's manifest declaration-as provided by the
Golan Heights Entrenchment Law-for the need to a Basic Law
legislation that normatively enshrines the referendum system as a binding
law in Israel, at least regarding the application of the Israeli law,
jurisdiction and administration over the Golan Heights-such
constitutional legislation, has not come to exist.
Surprisingly however, instead of the enactment of a Basic Law-as
provided in the Golan Heights Entrenchment Law-an ordinary
legislation, in the shape of the Referendum Law was made, thus not only
enshrining the concept of referendum in an ordinary law, but also
providing a complete set of rules for the implementation of such
referendum-rules that resemble the proceedings applicable in times of
holding elections to the Knesset.
Remarkably, the Referendum Law does not limit its application to the
saga surrounding the Golan Heights, but rather enlarges its scope to any
area that is subject to the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State
of Israel.3 Namely, even though the law does not state it straight forward,
the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem.
On December 13, 2010, I decided to challenge the constitutionality of
the Referendum Law by submitting a petition to the Supreme Court of
Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice (HCJ or the Court), against the
Knesset et al. (petition).4 In principle, I argued that if a constitutional
democracy is about to adopt a binding referendum system, then this must
be done through a constitutional amendment and not an ordinary
legislation. In addition, I asserted that the concept of binding referenda
contradicts the basic and fundamental constitutional principles on which
constitutional democracies stand; for it violates the required political,
social, and legal balances that otherwise such democracies may strike,
especially in the context of protecting the rights of minorities in
to the petition, the respondents
multicultural societies.' In response
6
se.
per
arguments
my
opposed to
During the first hearing session before the HCJ, on December 25,
2011, and following the Court's remarks, I agreed to limit the scope of
the petition to the constitutional queries concerning the proper form of
enactment for the Referendum Law, namely in a Basic Law, as
distinguished from an ordinary law.7 The idea behind making such a
decision is that no actual referendum was at stake, and thus a problem of
judicial review could have been emerged. At this stage, the Court urged
the respondents to agree on the issuance of a decree nisi, thus addressing
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Referendum Law, art. 3(1A)(a).
See HCJ 9149/10 (Isr.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the petition substantively, but the latter refused. At the end of the day, the
Court decided to hear the respondents' arguments against the issuance of
a decree nisi in a larger panel of seven judges, instead8 of three, basically
due to the important constitutional questions at stake.
Accordingly, the respondents argued in depth before the HCJ during
the second hearing session on November 20, 2012. Their basic argument
was that although it is constitutionally preferable to enshrine the
referendum system in a Basic Law legislation rather than an ordinary law,
still it is not necessary. 9 In addition, the respondents asserted that even if
I was right in my argument, the Court had no judicial power to intervene,
thus declaring the Referendum Law void.' 0 It was the respondents'
contention that the Court's power for judicial review is limited in scope
to extreme cases of unique circumstances that move heaven and earth. In
their view, this was not the case in this particular petition. At this stage,
the Court addressed the respondents again, seeking their consent to the
issuance of a decree nisi, but the latter were not ready to make any
concession. It was remarkable that during the long hearing at this session,
the judicial panel did not approach me with even a single question.
On December 25, 2011, following the second hearing session, and
despite the respondents' position, the HCJ issued a decree
nisi, thus
1
substantively.
petition
the
address
to
latter
the
requiring
A third hearing session before the HCJ, in which my arguments and
the respondents' assertions were supposed to be discussed in depth, was
scheduled for June 17, 2014. However, shortly before, on March 12,
2014, the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Referendum (Referendum Basic
Law), which incorporated the referendum system, as a binding apparatus,
in a Basic Law, thus leaving the details concerning the referendum's12
structure and its application valid as set forth in the Referendum Law.
Ironically, this happened at the time the petition was pending before the
HCJ, where the respondents'-which included the Knesset and the
Government-argued against the need for such Basic Law legislation.
In any case, and to this extent, the petition became irrelevant, for the
legal remedy sought by submitting it before the HCJ was achieved,
ultimately, by legislation. Accordingly, on May 13, 2014, the petition was
withdrawn.
In this Article, I aim at discussing the question whether it was
necessary to enact the Referendum Basic Law instead of, or in addition
to, the Referendum Law in order for the Knesset to incorporate the
referendum system as a binding mechanism in the Israeli law, or so
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Book of Laws, no. 2443 (Mar. 19, 2014).
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preferable as argued by the Knesset and the Government before the HCJ.
In addition, I purport to discuss the inadequacy of the referendum system
to legal systems of constitutional democratic features, regardless of the
question whether such a system was adopted by an ordinary legislation
or enshrined in a constitutional amendment. It is worthwhile to remember
that due to the Court's remarks, the latter argument was omitted from the
petition and accordingly was not discussed at all before the Court.
In the first Part of the Article, I provide a broad normative survey of
the entire legal infrastructure, in the light of which the constitutionality
of the laws on referendum must be examined. Further, I examine the
status of the substantive principle of the rule of law, as a binding
normative legal principle and not merely as a declarative interpretive
principle. Subsequently, I present the constitutional pillars upon which
Israel's Basic Laws rely. In this connection, I also discuss the HCJ's
power for judicial review, including the mandate to invalidate
unconstitutional laws. This constitutional debate necessarily entails an
examination of the constitutional mechanisms for amending Basic Laws
in Israel and the way in which protected fundamental rights may be
violated. This discussion in turn requires scrutinizing the primary
concepts that underlie the most basic legal principles on which the legal
regime in Israel is founded-both in terms of the civilian and political
identity of the State, and in terms of the relationship between the central
branches of the State (particularly, the legislative and executive
branches), and the role of the People as the sovereign in this relationship.
In the second Part of the Article, I engage in a concrete legal debate
regarding the constitutionality of the laws on referendum, led by the basic
principles, as described in the first Part of this Article.
Finally, in the third Part, I summarize the issue by indicating the
constitutional legal grounds that undermine the constitutionality of the
laws on referendum. Ultimately, this constitutional scrutiny of the laws
on referendum leads to one conclusion, namely, that these laws are
unconstitutional, and, as such, are void ab initio. This conclusion results
not only from the fact that the laws on referendum completely contradict
the constitutional system in the State of Israel-in relation to the
amendment of basic legislation-but also from their inherent
contradiction to the substantive principle of the rule of law. As such, they
afflict a fatal blow to the protected basic rights of its citizens in general
and of the Arab citizens of Israel, as a national minority, in particular, all
the more so Israel's Arab residents of the Golan Heights and East
Jerusalem. Among the violated fundamental rights are: the right to vote,
the right to be elected, the right to dignity and the right to equality. Thus,
the laws on referendum undermine the extremely delicate political, legal,
and constitutional balance on which the State of Israel was founded and
in which light its legal tradition was developed.
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In the following chapters, I intend to address the hereunder questions
in depth:
(1) Does the Referendum Law contradict or violate the substantive
principle of the rule of law?
(2) Whereas material modifications were initially effected through
ordinary legislation, namely, the Referendum Law, rather than through
basic legislation, does the Referendum Law materially modify
substantive constitutional provisions under Basic Law: The Knesset
and/or Basic Law: The Government and/or Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital
of Israel-otherwise than in accordance with accepted and binding
judicial rulings in the Israeli legal system?
(3) Do the Referendum Basic Law and the Referendum Law (laws on
referendum) violate fundamental rights, including the collective rights of
the Arab minority in the State of Israel-all the more so Israel's Arab
residents of the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem-protected by Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, otherwise than in accordance with the
provisions of the limitation clause enshrined in Section 8 of Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty?
(4) Do the laws on referendum violate fundamental rights, including
the collective rights of the Arab minority in the State of Israel-all the
more so Israel's Arab residents of the Golan Heights and East
Jerusalem-protected by Basic Law: The Knesset, otherwise than in
accordance with the judicial provisions of the limitation clause?
Before stepping forward, I would like to emphasize, that although this
Article concerns solely with the Israeli case surrounding the referendum
saga, it still stands on comparative and conceptual grounds, such that
apply to every democracy, all the more so to constitutional democracies.
II. THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

The laws on referendum test the Israeli legal system afresh. It poses a
serious legal challenge to the legal system. In this Part of the Article, I
will sketch the normative framework that shapes Israel's governmental
and constitutional systems. In light of my conclusions herein, I will, in
the next section, deal separately with the issue of the constitutionality of
the laws on referendum. As I will explain in detail below, the initial
enactment of the Referendum Law, and the legal position as provided by
the respondents to the petition before the HCJ, draws us, to a large extent,
back to the United Mizrachi Bank Ltd case (Mizrachi Bank case), 13 and
13. See generally CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village,
49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.), available at http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/united-mizrahibank-v-migdal-cooperative-bank-part-i. This is deemed as a touchstone case in the constitutional
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reconsiders some of the judicial rulings and declarations made in that
case.
A. The (FormalandSubstantive) Principleof the Rule ofLaw
The rule of law, in its substantive sense, deals with the aspiration for
governmental actions to comply with certain fundamental requirements.
These requirements are intended to guarantee the internal morality of the
law, which is critical to ensuring that the public feels committed to the
law and complies with its provisions out of recognition of the law's
binding validity. Safeguarding these principles allows the law to fulfill its
mission as a social institution; the purpose of which is to enable human
beings to live together, increase the public's sense of security and protect
individual freedoms. Respect for the rule of law is essential to ensure the
legitimacy of law enforcement
among the members of the public who are
14
subject to that law.
In this context, I am not referring to the concept of "law" in its narrow
sense (Gesetz in German, loi in French, ley in Spanish, and law in
English), but rather to the term "Law" in a broader sense that even equates
to "justice." Law is binding not because it has been enacted in a proper
formal procedure by a duly elected legislature, but because it is just and
proper (Recht in German, droit in French, and derecho in Spanish). 5
The essence of this concept lies in the distinction between formal and
substantive democracy. While formal democracy is only interested in the
opinion of the majority and seeks to enforce the majority's decisions,
whether these are good or bad, substantive democracy respects the
opinion of the majority yet, at the same time, guarantees that minorities
(weakened groups) are protected, particularly in circumstances where the
majority misuses its powers to abuse these minorities. In this context, in
another place I once wrote:
The Athenian state had a constitution and a supreme court. Neither
Socrates nor Plato criticized democracy as such. Socrates was
inciting the aristocratic young men of Athens to revolt against the
democracy of Athens, namely, against the rule of the majority.
This is what captured Plato's mind in offering The Republic, the
legal history of the state of Israel, where the normative status of Israel's Basic Laws was discussed,
as well as the HCJ's power on judicial review.
14.

AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF

ISRAEL: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Vol. 1, at 284-85 (2005) (in Hebrew).
15. MOHAMMED S. WATrAD, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL LAW: THREE TENETS ON
AMERICAN & COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 124-25

(2007); RONALD DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN 11 (1990); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971); IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999); NORBERTO BOBBIO, THE AGE
OF RIGHTS (Allan Cameron trans., 1996); Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
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challenge of providing a true definition of justice, a philosophy of
just and good society; for him, democracy is the rule of Law,
namely, the rule of Good and Justice ... While formal democracy
is the rule of the majority, constitutional democracy considers the
voice of the majority as another factor in determining what is fair
and just, thus preventing any likelihood of abuse of minority rights
(those whose interests are not protected by the majority). Formal
democracy acts in accordance with the rule of the legislature, no
matter how right, decent, just, and fair the legislature might be;
what the legislature says the law is becomes binding law.
Constitutional democracy scrutinizes the legislature's actions for
their compatibility with the fundamental principles of fairness,
reason, justice, and good. Finally, formal democracy represents the
rule of law, but constitutional democracy is driven by the rule of
Law. As Plato once argued against formal democracy, those who
belong to the majority are concerned only with their own
immediate pleasure and gratification, and therefore a democracy
that relies
on the rule of the majority cannot produce good human
16
beings.
The principle of the rule of law is counted, therefore, among the
fundamental and central principles of any legal system, shaping the
content and interpretation of the legal norms and often determining their
validity. The fundamental principles are superior to ordinary legislative
provisions. 17 This approach reflects the view that the constitution itself is
not always paramount, as even the constitution is subject to these
fundamental principles.18 In this context, the remarks of Justice Aharon
Barak in the matter of the Laor Movement-One Heartand a New Spirit
are apt:
In theory-principle, it is possible for a court in a democratic society
to declare that a law, which violates fundamental principles of the
system, is void; even if these fundamental principles are not
anchored in a rigid constitution or in an entrenched Basic Law.
There is nothing axiomatic in the approach that a law is not
invalidated because of its content. The invalidation of a law by the
court because it seriously infringes fundamental principles does
not violate the principle of the sovereignty of the legislature, as

16. See WATTrAD, supra note 15, at 196-98.
17. EA 1/65 Yardur v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee of the Sixth Knesset
19(3) P.D. 365, 389 [1965] (Isr.).
18. SHMUEL SAADIA & LIAV ORGAD, REFERENDUM 123 (2000) (in Hebrew).
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sovereignty is always limited. 19
B. ConstitutionalCharacteristicsof the Basic Laws

Israel's Basic Laws were adopted in an atmosphere where it was
intended to formulate supra legal constitutional norms. They certainly
include elements characteristic of constitutions. 20 As such, through its

rulings, the HCJ elevated these Basic Laws to a supreme normative status
rising above that of other laws called "ordinary laws." Accordingly, when

one of an ordinary
a legal norm in a Basic Law conflicts with another
21
yields.
latter
the
and
prevail
will
law, the first
Most of the fundamental rights protected on the constitutional level
are grouped within the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty. Nonetheless, this Basic Law does not accord explicit protection
to all utopian fundamental rights. Over the years, especially and
particularly following the adoption of Basic Law: Human Dignity and

Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, as well as the judgment
in the MizrachiBank case 22-but also earlier 23-the HCJ enshrined some
of the unprotected fundamental rights within the right to dignity. Among
the right to
the rights which are not expressly protected one
24 may find
freedom of expression and the right to equality.
C. The Force of Basic Laws as the Basisfor JudicialReview

Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and
even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is
19. HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement-One Heart and a New Spirit v. Knesset Speaker 44(3)
P.D. 529, 555 [1989] (Isr.).
20.

EITAN INBAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS REFLECTED IN JUDICIAL RULINGS 69 (2001) (in

Hebrew).
21. RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, at 98.
22. Mizrachi Bank, CA 6821/93.
23. See generally HCJ 355/79 Catalan v. Israel Prisons Service 34(3) PD 294 [1979] (Isr.);
CA 294/91 Burial Society "Jerusalem Community" v. Kastenbaum 46(2) PD 464 [1991] (Isr.);
HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance 23(1) PD 693 [1969] (Isr.); HCJ 114/78 Burqan v.
Minister of Finance 32(2) PD 800 [1978] (Isr.); HCJ 73/53 "Kol Ha'am" Ltd. v. Minister of the
Interior 7 PD 871 [1953] (Isr.); HCJ 253/64 J'aris v. Haifa District Commissioner 18(4) PD 673
[1964] (Isr.); HCJ 1/49 Bejerano v. Minister ofPolice 2 PD 80 [1949] (Isr.); HCJ 337/81 Mitrani
v. Minister of Transport 33(3) PD 337 [1981] (Isr.).
24. Cf HCJ 5394/92 Hofert v. "Yad Vashem" Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes
Remembrance Authority 48(3) PD 353 [1992] (Isr.); HCJ 4674/94 Mitral Ltd. v. The Knesset
50(5) PD 15 [1994] (Isr.); HCJ 5688/92 Weichselbaum v. Minister of Def. 47(2) PD 812 [1992]
(Isr.); HCJ 3299/93 Weichselbaum v. Minister of Def. 49(2) PD 195 [1993] (Isr.); HCJ 4541/94
Miller v. Minister of Def. 49(4) PD 94 [1994] (Isr.); CA 4463/94 Golan v. Israel Prisons Serv.
50(4) PD 136 [1994] (Isr.); HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Ltd. v. Film & Play Review Bd. 50(5) PD
661 [1994] (Isr.).
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no abuse of power; but constant experience shows us that every
man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and carry his authority
as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue
itself has need of limits? To prevent this abuse, it is necessary,
from the very nature of things that power should be a check to
power. 25
The HCJ, by virtue of the supra-legal constitutional authority vested
in it by Section 15(c) of Basic Law: The Judiciary and, especially,
following the judicial decisions rendered in the wake of the Mizrachi
Bank case26--as well as in accordance with earlier case law,27 has
jurisdiction to consider and determine the legality of laws. The process
of reviewing the legality of laws is essentially interpretive, where the 28task
of interpretation is one of the chief powers wielded by the judiciary.
There is no dispute as to the authority of the HCJ to interpret laws,
Basic Laws, regulations and other legal norms. When the HCJ interprets
an ordinary law in light of a Basic Law, which it is also authorized to
interpret, and a conflict is discovered between the Basic Law and the
ordinary law, that conflict essentially relates to the interpretation of the
relevant laws.29
The ruling in the Mizrachi Bank case further strengthened the position
of the HCJ in terms of its authority to review not only the legality of laws
but also the constitutionality of laws. 30 A chief aspect of this latter
authority is that it enables the Court to fulfill its mandate to maintain the
rule of law. 3 1 After all, the primary function of the HCJ is to instill
democratic values in society and enforce the rule of law, primarily on the
governmental authorities, where the legitimacy of the constitution and the
Basic Laws grant legitimacy to the judicial review.
Another key aspect of the legitimacy of the HCJ's authority to review
the constitutionality of laws may be found in the implementation of the
fundamental constitutional principle concerning the separation of
powers-in the substantive sense of that principle (i.e., in the sense of the
25.
26.

BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS Vol. 1, ch. 4 (1748).
See MizrachiBank, CA 6821/93; see also Basic Laws of Israel, Judiciary § 15(c) (1984)

[hereinafter Judiciary].
27. Cf RUBINsTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, at 182; HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Ass'n v.
Broad. Auth., 35(4) PD 1 [1981] (Isr.); HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Speaker of the Knesset 33(3)
PD 141 [1982] (Isr.); HCJ 726/94 Clal Ins. Co. v. Minister of Fin. 48(5) PD 441 [1994] (Isr.).

28.

INBAR, supra note 20, at 84; RuBiNsTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, at 151-63. See

generally Rivka Weill, Reconciling ParliamentarySovereignty and Judicial Review: On the
Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 457 (2012).

29.

INBAR, supra note 20, at 89.

30.

See Mizrachi Bank, CA 6821/93.

31.

RUBINsTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, at 265-311.
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implementation of checks and balances).32
This is true a fortiori, given that the Basic Laws were accorded
constitutional supra-legal normative status-particularly following the
judgment in the MizrachiBank case. 33 That judgment laid out clear rules
relating not only to the normative status of the Basic Laws but also to the
normative mechanism involved in implementing them, including
amendments and violations of rights protected by the laws, and examined
the nature of formally entrenched Basic Laws and others which are
substantively entrenched.34
D. The ConstitutionalOperatingMechanism and its Implications:
Varying Basic Laws versus Violating ProtectedConstitutionalRights;
FormalEntrenchment versus Substantive Entrenchment
A Basic Law may be varied only by means of another Basic Law; it
cannot be varied through "ordinary legislation," whether the original
Basic Law has been formally entrenched or not.35 Moreover, a violation
of a fundamental right protected by Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty is permitted only where that violation meets the cumulative
conditions set by the limitation clause, as embodied in Section 8 of this
Basic Law. In effect, the limitation clause, with its varied requirements,
substantively entrenches the fundamental rights protected by Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty.
Apart from the latter Basic Law, fundamental rights are also protected
by other basic legislation; for instance Basic Law: The Knesset, such as
the right to vote and the right to be elected. This should be mentioned
though that Basic Law: The Knesset does not incorporate any clause
providing for substantive entrenchment (e.g., the limitation clause). In
cases where a fundamental right is violated in the latter context, a judicial
limitation clause is applied. The judicial limitation clause, in essence,
takes the content and requirements of the limitation clause familiar to us
from Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and "exports" it to other
basic legislation, such as Basic Law: The Knesset, and consequently
accords constitutional protection to fundamental rights where no
statutory limitation clause exists (judicial limitation clause).36
32.

Id. at 127-28; HCJ 73/85 "Kach" Faction v. Speaker of the Knesset 39(3) PD 141

[1986] (Isr.); HCJ 306/81 Plato-Sharon v. Knesset Committee ofthe Knesset 35(4) PD 118 [1982]
(Isr.); HCJ 5364/94 Welner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party 49(l) PD 758 [1995] (Isr.).

33.

See Mizrachi Bank, CA 6821/93.

34.

Id.

35. See id.
36. HCJ 3434/96 Hoffnung v. Speaker of the Knesset 50(3) PD 57 [1997] (Isr.); HCJ
212/03 Herut Nat'l Movement v. Chairman ofthe Elections Comm. to the Sixteenth Knesset 57(1)
PD (1) 750 [2004] (Isr.); EA 92/03 Mofaz v. Chairman of the Elections Comm. to the Sixteenth
Knesset 57(3) PD 793 [2004] (Isr.).
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The formula which should be applied to the judicial limitation clause,
and consequently the interpretation which should be given to the elements
of the judicial limitation clause, are identical to the formula and
clause appearing in
interpretation given to the wording of the limitation
37
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, namely:
There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except
by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a
proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required or by
regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.
38
To summarize these issues it should be emphasized:

(1) When considering Basic Laws which provide for both formal
and substantive entrenchment (i.e., at present just Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation), any variations to such a Basic Law must
be tested in accordance with the formal entrenchment, provided
that the variation is effected by means of a Basic Law with a
majority of 61 Knesset members, or any other majority which the
particular Basic Law itself requires. However, a violation of
fundamental rights under such a Basic Law must be tested on the
basis of the substantive entrenchment (the requirements of the
limitation clause).39
(2) When considering Basic Laws, which provide for only
substantive entrenchment (the limitation clause) (i.e., at present
just Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), any variations to
such a Basic Law must be effected by means of a Basic Law albeit
without the need for a particular majority. However, a violation of
fundamental rights under such a Basic Law must meet the
conditions of the substantive entrenchment provision (the
requirements of the limitation clause).4 °
(3) When considering a Basic Law which does not contain a
provision for substantive entrenchment, then:
(i) If it is formally entrenched, a variation to such a Basic Law must
be carried out through a Basic Law adopted with the required
majority, whereas a violation of a protected fundamental right
must be carried out through and in accordance with the judicial
limitation clause.
37. Basic Laws of Israel, Human Dignity and Liberty § 8 (1992) [hereinafter Human
Dignity and Liberty].
38. Cf RuBINsTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, at 109-2 1.
39. HCJ 1368/94 Porath v. Government of Israel 57(5) PD 913 [1995] (Isr.).
40. HCJ 6055/95 Zemach v. Minister of Def. 53(5) PD 241 [1996] (Isr.).
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(ii) If not formally entrenched, a variation to such a Basic Law
must be carried out through a Basic Law adopted by any majority
in the Knesset, whereas a violation of a protected fundamental
right must be carried out through a variation of the Basic Law
itself, or through and in accordance with the judicial limitation
clause.
E. The Nature of the Regime of the State of Israel as a (Liberaland
Constitutional)Representative ParliamentaryDemocracy: The
Legislature, the Executive and the Idea of a Referendum
Accordingly we, members of the People's Council, representatives
of the Jewish Community of Eretz-Israel and the Zionist
Movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the
British Mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our natural and
historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the United
Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a
Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel. We
declare that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the
Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath... (May 15th, 1948),
until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the
State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted
by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October
1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of
State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall
Government of the Jewish State, to be called
be the Provisional
41
"Israel.",

The language of the Israeli Declaration of Establishment is sharp,
clear and explicit: "until the establishment of the elected, regular
authorities of the State, in accordance with the Constitution which shall
be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly. ."42 In other words,
the governmental authorities, their identity, nature, structure and
operative mechanisms were to be established in the constitution to be
adopted by the Constituent Assembly. That is to say, the identity of the
governmental authorities, including the manner of their election, would
be determined within the framework of constitutional legal norms and not
through ordinary legislation. This was put into effect with the adoption,
inter alia, of Basic Law: The Knesset, Basic Law: The Government and
Basic Law: The Judiciary.
The Declaration of Establishment does not possess statutory or
41.

DECLARATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

10 & 1-1(Isr. 1948)

("Eretz-Israel" means "The Land of Israel.").
42. Id.
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constitutional status. It is an interpretative source only. The Declaration
of Establishment does not create binding positive law. It merely reflects
the vision and credo of the People. Consequently, it is necessary to
consider the statements made by the Supreme Court when interpreting
and giving meaning to the laws of the state. 43 This is true especially in
light of the explicit reference to the Declaration of Establishment within
the "Basic Principles Clause" of Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty. 4 This clause states that human rights "under this Basic Law"
must be interpreted in the spirit of the principles of the Declaration
Establishment of the State of Israel. 45 The comments of Justice Dov Levin
in the Clal case are apposite in this context:
Although the Declaration of Establishment was not recognized as
possessing constitutional validity and in any event did not purport
to express binding law, it expressed principles and values, which
according to the perception of the People deserved to be our
guiding principles, an oracle, when interpreting the law applicable
to the state and its citizens. Accordingly, from the early days this
Court saw the Proclamation of Independence as a primary source
for interpretation of the law. Above all - it is a beacon that
illuminates our path when 46
shaping basic civil rights and
implementing them in practice.
F. The Legislatureand the People: The ReciprocalRelationship
Between the Legislature and the Executive
The State of Israel is a liberal, constitutional, representative,
parliamentary democracy. This is evident from the arrangements put in
place for holding elections in Israel under both Basic Law: The Knesset
and the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 1969 (Knesset
Elections Law).4 7 The elections to the Knesset are the highest expression
of the democratic nature of the regime in Israel. The constitutional and
statutory arrangements express the desire for "self-government;" their
purpose is to ensure that legislators represent the views of the public and
use their legislative powers to advance the public interest. The elections
to the Knesset express the ideal whereby every citizen is granted an equal
opportunity to express his/her nature as a "political creature," by
43. HCJ 10/48 Ziv v. Acting Director of the Municipal Area of Tel Aviv 1 PD 85 [1949]
(Isr.); HCJ 7/48 al-Karbutali v. Minister of Def. 2 PD 5 [1949] (Isr.); CA 450/70 Rogozinski v.
State of Israel 26(1) PD 129 [1970] (Isr.); RUBrNSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, at 43.
44. See Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 37, § 1.

45.

Id.

46.
47.

See supra text accompanying note 27; Judgment of Justice Dov Levin
The Book of Laws, no. 556 (Apr. 14, 1969).
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recognizing the Knesset's power to act as the primary "public platform"
of the State,
for staging a public discourse regarding the proper nature
48
while maintaining a "free market" of ideas and opinions.
Israel's legislature is the Knesset; it is this body that has the exclusive
power to make laws, as an expression of the will of the People. The
People express their will through their representatives in the Knesset.
Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset establishes the system of elections
to the Knesset as follows: "The Knesset shall be elected by general,
national, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections, in accordance
shall not be varied save by
with the Knesset Elections Law; this section
' 49
a majority of the members of the Knesset.
As we are concerned with a provision in a Basic Law, it is evident that
it can only be varied by means of another basic legislation, adopted with
the majority required by Section 4, namely, 61 Knesset members-given
that the full number of the Members of the Knesset (MKs) is 120.50 In
other words, Section 4 cannot be varied by means of ordinary legislation,
even if the entire Knesset unanimously adopts that legislation (i.e., 120
MKs voting in favor).
The essence of the electoral system is to guarantee the democratic
parliamentary nature of the Knesset, within the framework of which the
People are represented by the parliamentary factions. The People vote for
parties vying for a place in the Knesset. The elected party members,
acting as a faction rather than in their personal capacity, choose the MK
upon whom they recommend that the President impose the task of
forming the government. Only the President is authorized to decide on
the identity of the MK who will be charged with the duty of forming the
government.
The parliamentary representative democracy is essentially intended to
replace the classical concept of direct democracy, which originated in
ancient Greece. That concept required all eligible voters to gather in the
central square of Athens and vote "for" or "against." In a modem
representative parliamentary democracy, the legislature is not comprised
And as its name denotes:
of the People but representatives of the People.
51
State."
the
of
parliament
the
is
"The Knesset
Evidence of this can be found in the fact that once the 120
representatives of the People are elected (who together comprise the
legislature, namely, Israel's Knesset), the ability of the People (the
sovereign) to make direct decisions is eliminated. Once the 120
representatives of the People have been elected, the power of the
sovereign (the People) can only be expressed in the political arena
48.

RuBiNSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, vol. 2, at 557.

49. Knesset, infra note 51, § 4.
50. See MizrachiBank, CA 6821/93; Knesset, infra note 51, § 4.
51. Basic Laws of Israel, The Knesset § 1 (1958) [hereinafter Knesset].
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through its various representatives in the Knesset, and through them
alone. This concept has many practical implications.
To start with, MKs are not directly elected by the People, but rather
by their parties-and sometimes solely by the head of these parties-and
52
presented to the People as candidates for the Knesset (factions).
In addition, in Israel, members of the executive branch are generally
elected from among the MKs. Indeed, as a matter of statutory duty, some
executive branch positions must be filled by MKs; for example the
positions 55of Prime Minister,53 Acting Prime Minister,54 and deputy
ministers.
Furthermore, the Knesset's ability to disperse does not depend on the
People, as they actually have no power to dissolve the Knesset. The
Knesset's power to dissolve itself before the completion of its four-year
term can be implemented only by means of a law, for which a majority
of 61 MKs is needed.56 More specifically, not only is the dissolution of
the Knesset independent of the People who elected it-that dissolution
depends, first and foremost, on the executive branch, namely, the
government. This is because the only cases in which the Knesset can
disperse prematurely are: (a) when it has failed to approve the State's
budget submitted to it by the executive branch, within the first three
months of the fiscal year; 57 and (b) when the Prime Minister recommends,
and the President agrees, to disperse the Knesset on the grounds that a
branch, thereby prevents
majority in the Knesset opposes the executive
58
the Government from functioning properly.
Besides, legislative work, which is exclusively within the province of
the Knesset, is not, and cannot be, directly affected or directed by the
People. Only MKs, the Government, and the Knesset committees have
the authority to table bills. The Knesset plenum and committees, assisted
by legal advisers of the Knesset, participate in the various stages of the
legislative process and (unless otherwise statutorily provided, as
explained above) it is the Knesset plenum that enacts laws by majority
vote of the participants.
Moreover, where the Knesset seeks to extend its term, in view of the
existence of special circumstances that prevent the holding of timely
elections, it has the power to do so even without having to go back to the
People. Such an extension may be achieved by the enactment of a law

52.
53.

Id. § 5A.
Basic Laws of Israel, The Government § 5(b) (2001) [hereinafter Government].

54.

Id. § 5(d).

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. § 25.
Knesset, supra note 51, § 34.
Id. § 36A.
Government, supra note 53, § 29.
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59
passed by a majority of 80 MKs.
Not only that, but also the salaries of the MKs are prescribed by statute
which the MKs themselves enact. MKs, when setting their own wages,
do not consult with60the People, and the latter have no impact whatsoever
on such decisions.
Another argument is that, whereas the election of MKs to the Knesset,
as representatives of the People, depends, largely, on the Peoplethrough the parties that select their representatives in the Knesset-this
is not the case with regard to an MK resignation. This last issue is the sole
prerogative of the MK concerned. 6 '
Furthermore, in view of the provisions of Basic Law: The Knesset in
this regard, which cannot be stipulated against, when it comes to the
termination of an MK tenure by virtue of his/her appointment to a
position, the holder of which is barred from standing as a candidate for
the Knesset,62 or termination or suspension because the MK has been
he cannot continue in
convicted of an offense entailing moral turpitude,
63
desires.
so
nation
entire
the
if
even
office
Additionally, the Knesset elects the President of the State, 64 the State
Comptroller, 65 the two MKs who represent it on the Judicial Selection
Committee and the two MKs who represent it on the electoral body of the
Chief Rabbinical Council. 66 In these activities, the Knesset, as a body,
operates in accordance with its absolute discretion, in a manner consistent
with the thinking of the People's representatives. The representatives of
the People do not turn to the People for advice.
Moreover, the power to remove the President of the State, the State
Comptroller and the Prime Minister from their positions is entrusted to
the Knesset.67 In practicing their power, in this regard, MKs do not have
to consult with the People on that issue.
Added to all these is the provision concerning the replacement of
MKs, according to which any MK who has vacated his/her seat, will be
automatically replaced by his/her party's appointed candidate whose
name appears first in the party's list of candidates who were not elected
59. Knesset, supranote 51, § 9A.
60. Id. § 39.
61. Id. §40.
62. Id. § 42.
63. Id. §§ 42 & 42A.
64. The Basic Laws of Israel, The President of the State § 3 (1964) [hereinafter President
of the State].
65. The Basic Laws of Israel, The State Comptroller § 7 (1988) [hereinafter State
Comptroller].
66. See President of the State, supra note 64, § 3(A); State Comptroller, supra note 65, §
7(A); Judiciary, supra note 26, § 4(B); The Rabbinical Judges Law of 1955, § 6(A).
67. President of the State, supra note 64, § 20; State Comptroller, supra note 65, § 13;
Government, supra note 53, § 18.
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to the Knesset.68 This provision, like the crystallization and finalization
of the party's MKs candidates list, does not consider the will of the People
at all; a will that could have changed after the initial list of candidates for
the Knesset has been completed.
A final example in this context concerns the quasi-judicial role of the
Knesset, as a body, in relation to the removal of the procedural immunity
of MKs. 69 While the People elect their representatives in the Knesset
"directly" or almost directly, the MKs may remove the procedural
immunity of another Knesset member, without first consulting with the
People, even though this immunity is required in order for the MKs to
discharge the mandate which they were elected to serve in the Knesset.
In this regard, it should be noted that this mandate is entrusted to them in
accordance with their declaration of allegiance under Section 15 of Basic
Law: The Knesset.
Thus, immediately upon their election, the umbilical cord between the
120 representatives to Israel's parliament and the People is severed. Even
if the elected MKs breach the terms of the manifesto upon which they
were elected, the People would still lack the power to replace them at this
stage, and would have to wait for the next election to do so. Thus, not
only is the influence of the People indirect, insofar as concerns the
dealings of the legislature following elections, but is indirect in general.
In conclusion, to this latter point, it should be emphasized that the
Knesset's decisions are reached by a majority within the Knesset, 70 and
not by a majority of the People, albeit the underlying assumption is that
the various MKs accurately reflect the distribution of the People's views
on a concrete issue. In fact, this is not the case. The 120 elected
representatives' commitment to voters is confined to the moral and
declarative arena only, and indeed one should note Section 15 of Basic
Law: The Knesset, in this regard, according to which, following his/her
election to the Knesset, the MK declares his/her allegiance as follows: "I
pledge myself to bear my allegiance to' 7 the
State of Israel and faithfully
1
discharge my mandate in the Knesset.
The moral and declarative credibility of the representatives of the
People is scrutinized every four years when elections are held for the
Knesset. Beyond this, there is no direct correlation between the
functioning of MKs, including their decision making process, and the
People. Basic Law: The Knesset also refrains from establishing any
primary legal norm that would allow MKs to return to the People for the
purpose of making decisions; this is part of the broader understanding of
the structure of the representative parliamentary system, which binds the
68.
69.
70.
71.

Knesset, supra note 51, § 43.
Id. § 13; Knesset Members Immunity, Rights and Obligations Law, 1951, § 13.
Knesset, supra note 51, § 25.
Id. § 15.
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State of Israel.
Why is that so? The answer lies in the governmental system in Israel,
under which the People wield power in relation to parties and factions but
not in relation to the members of the parties elected to the Knesset. This
power manifests itself every four years. It should be recalled that not all
parties operate a system of primary elections. Within its four-year term,
the legislative authority is therefore limited by and subordinate to the
personal desires of its members; the collective party discipline of the
members of each faction; operational, professional and non-professional
considerations of the executive authority; professional and nonprofessional parliamentary considerations of each individual Knesset
member; and professional and non-professional political, narrow, broad,
regional, nationalistic, national and international considerations.
Again, it is worth emphasizing that MKs are elected representatives.
After the elections, they operate within the framework of their parties.
The parties and the MKs represent a wide range of attitudes and opinions
on various topics. These attitudes and opinions are reflected in the
Knesset's plenum and committees' discussions and decisions. This is also
the source of the concept of "party discipline," which often imposes
certain opinions on MKs that do not necessarily reflect the will of the
voters (i.e., the People). Hanna Fenichel Pitkin has lucidly articulated the
nature of the representative parliamentary electoral system, as follows:
representing here means acting in the interest of the represented,
in a manner responsive to them. The representative must act
independently, his action must involve discretion and judgment;
he must be one who acts. The represented must also be (conceived
as) capable of independent action and judgment, not merely being
taken care of. Moreover, despite the resulting potential for conflict
between representative and represented about what is to be done,
that conflict must not normally take place. The representative must
act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it occurs an
explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds
with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of
their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are
not in accord with their interest. 72
In this context, it is also worth quoting the remarks of Justice Aharon
Barak in the Mizrachi Bank case:
Our political and legal culture is not based upon a special appeal
to the People by means of a referendum. No referendum has taken
72.

HANNA FENICHEL PITKN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
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place in the past. Our political and legal culture is not built upon
"direct" democracy, but upon "representative" democracy. Our
political and legal culture also maintains that the appeal to the
People takes place in the context of the electionsfor the Knesset.73
G. The Executive Authority and the People: The Reciprocal
RelationshipBetween the Executive andLegislative Branches
Not only do the People have no real impact on the legislature, they
also have no real influence over the government. Interaction exists only
between the legislative and the executive authorities. As I have already
shown, the argument that the legislature represents the People is
answered by the fact that the People's influence over the legislature is
confined to Election Day, once every four years, and even then only to a
limited extent.
In the State of Israel, it is customary for most of the members of the
executive authority to be selected from among the 120 MKs; sometimes
positive law itself requires this. 74 Nonetheless, neither the Prime Minister
nor the Government are directly elected by the People. If anything, it
could be argued that because of the Israeli practice as described above,
the People have some influence over the abstract identity of the members
of the Government. Yet, even if the latter were true, presently the People
do not have the capacity to decide on the identity of the Prime Minister,
as the authority to impose the task of forming the Government on any of
the 120 MKs is vested exclusively in the President, following
consultation with the representatives of the parliamentary parties.75
In addition, the Government is collectively responsible towards the
Knesset; whereas the ministers, who in the main are themselves MKs, are
accountable to the Prime Minister in respect of the functions they are
appointed to fulfill. 76 No Prime Minister, minister, or Government is, as
a single large entity, accountable to the People as such. Instead, the
Government alone, as a cohesive body, is collectively responsible to the
Knesset in the latter's capacity as the representative body of the People.
Consequently, when examining the Government's responsibility, it is
necessary to refer to the Knesset as a body, rather than to the People as a
nation.
In support of this position, we must consider Section 3 of Basic Law:
The Government, according to which: "The Government holds office by
virtue of the confidence of the Knesset;" in other words, not by virtue of
73.
74.
75.
76.

Mizrachi Bank, CA 6821/93; Judgment of Justice Barak
See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
Government, supra note 53, § 7.
Id. §4.
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the direct trust of the People, but by their implied confidence-shown
through the Knesset. 7
In this spirit, we must read the words of the declaration of allegiance
spoken by the Prime Minister: "I (name), as Prime Minister, undertake to
uphold the State of Israel and its laws, to faithfully fulfill my role as the
Prime Minister and to comply with the decisions of the Knesset," as well
as the declaration of allegiance spoken by the ministers: "I (name), as a
member of the Government, undertake to uphold the State of Israel and
its laws, to faithfully fulfill my role as a member of the Government and
to comply with the decisions of the Knesset. ' '7 8 These two declarations
give effect to the obligations of the executive branch toward the
legislative body, known as the "Knesset," and not to the People who have
elected their representatives who constitute the "Knesset." This
conceptual approach is reinforced by a consideration of Section 15 of
Basic Law: The Government, in relation to the need for the Knesset's
approval before an additional minister may be co-opted to the
Government.79
The People, as such, also lack the power-save through their
representatives in the Knesset-to affect the status of the Prime Minister,
his/her government or his/her ministers. 80 We have already seen that the
People have no real influence on their representatives in the Knesset,
whereby, the People have no influence either over the executive
authority, save on a single occasion, once every four years.
Moreover, oversight of the Government is entrusted to the Knesset.
This is reflected in the plenum through the submission of motions for the
agenda and parliamentary questions, as well as discussions in Knesset
committees to which ministers or their representatives are summoned to
report on their activities in their capacity as the executive branch.8'
Even the salaries of ministers and deputy ministers, including other
fees paid to them during their term of office or thereafter, or their next of
kin after death, are determined by law-enacted, as noted, by the
or one of its committees,
Knesset-or by a decision by the Knesset
82
authorized by the Knesset for that purpose.
The life of the Government, its functioning and efficiency therefore,
depend largely on the life of the Knesset as the body representing the
People, and not on the People directly. Government decisions to go to
war 83 or enter into peace agreements are subject, at most, to the approval
77. Id.§3.
78. Id.§ 14.
79. Id. § 15.
80. See, e.g., Government, supra note 53, § 18.
81. Knesset Law, 1994; Knesset Regulations.
82. Knesset Law, 1994, § 16.
83. Government, supra note 53, § 40.
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of the Knesset, but not to the approval of the People. The mandate is given
from the start to the Knesset alone, and it is the supreme body from which
the executive branch draws its vitality; it and it alone. The authority of
this body, as the house of representatives of the People, remains in effect
as long as it has not dispersed in accordance with the grounds prescribed
by law and as long as no further elections have been held in Israel. Until
then, the People do not wield direct power, which would enable them to
influence the activity of the Knesset, and certainly not the activity of the
Government. A weighty question arises: What are the powers of the
Government? The answer to this question is found in Basic Law: The
Government.
At this point, it should be emphasized that Basic Law: The
Government, including all its sections and subsections, is formally
entrenched. In other words, this law cannot be varied, save
by a Basic
84
NKs.
61
of
majority
a
with
Knesset
the
by
Law adopted
As provided in Section 32 of Basic Law: The Government, which
states: "The Government is authorized to perform in the name of the State
and subject to any law, all actions which are not legally incumbent on
another authority," the principle authority of the executive branch is
residual in nature. 85 This provision is entrenched, as stipulated in Section
44 of the same Basic Law, so that varying the residual powers of
government, as provided in Section
32, requires the adoption of a Basic
86
Law by a majority of 61 MKs.
On its face, this residual power erodes the status of the Knesset as the
body that determines the functions of government and the scope of its
powers in basic legislation or by statute. This is because the principle of
the rule of law and the principle of administrative legality require that the
executive authority act only within the scope of the powers conferred
upon it by law-by the Knesset.87 However, the scope of the activity
imposed on the executive branch is immense and accordingly cannot be
regulated in its entirety by statute. 88 This requires the Government to act
routinely in89areas that the Knesset has not yet regulated through primary
legislation.
The Government's residual power is designed for this purpose, and is
applied only where the subject matter of the authority has not been
imposed by law on another authority, and is always subject to any

84. Id. § 44.
85. Id. § 32.
86. Id.
87. HCJ 36/51 Chet v. Municipality of Haifa 5 PD 1553 (Isr.); HCJ 347/84 Petach Tikvah
v. Minister of the Interior 39(1) PD 813, 817 (Isr.).
88.

RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, at 159-62.

89.

HCJ 5128/94 Federman v. Minister of Police 48(5) PD 647 (Isr.).
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applicable law.9" In order to enable the Government to properly fulfill its
role as the executive branch, 91 Section 32 of Basic Law: The Government
is designed to build a constitutional bridge between the principles of
administrative legality and the rule of law and the daily needs of the
country.
The powers of the Government, therefore, are subject formally,
legally and, primarily administratively, to the Knesset. Certainly, the
Government is responsible for managing the daily life of the People, but
its decisions are not subject to the approval of the People, and, at most,
require the approval of the People's representatives in the Knesset.
H. Interim Conclusion
Without entering into a discussion about the advantages and
disadvantages of the representative parliamentary system, the remarks
made above leave no doubt that the People, as the sovereign, lack any
function, formal or substantive, in the political game. This is because
interaction is confined primarily to the legislative and the executive
authorities. The role of the People and their power to directly-or almost
directly-exert serious influence is expressed only on Election Day by
which, once every four years, the People exert their influence. In the
interim, the representatives of the legislative authority and the
representatives of the executive authority-who often are the samemust engage in a balancing process between the mandate, which they
were elected or appointed to carry out, and other considerations required
by the job and the needs of the hour. These representatives must weigh
political, factional, partisan, regional, national, nationalistic,
international, parliamentary and diplomatic considerations, some of
which are professional and some unprofessional, some narrow and some
broad, some formal and some substantive.
This conceptual and practical approach is mandated, inter alia, first
by the fact that the citizens, who constitute the People, are in large
laymen, and second by the need to engage in numerous balancing
processes, among a broad variety of considerations, as part of the process
of parliamentary and operational decision-making. The laymen citizens
are often unaware of, or at minimum unable to digest, these balancing
processes and considerations. Finally, when engaged in faithfully
performing its work, the executive authority often comes to arrangements
of which the layman citizen has no knowledge whatsoever, and which, if
exposed to, would almost certainly undermine their success. For example,
decisions to sign or avoid signing peace agreements, or decisions to start
90. HCJ 8600/04 Shimoni v. Prime Minister 59(5) PD 673 (Isr.).
91. HCJ 1163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs v. Prime Minister (Isr.)
(unpublished).
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or avoid a war, or decisions to engage in or reject a prisoner exchange.
I. Basic Rights in Israel: The Right to Vote, the Right to be Elected, the
Right to Dignity and the Right to Equality
The rights to vote and to be elected are fundamental rights in any
democratic regime. Ensuring the right of individuals to participate in
elections is an essential service in a democracy. The rights to vote and to
be elected do not exist in a vacuum; they are founded and supported by
the entire mechanism of the election laws, as established, in Israel, by
Basic Law: The Knesset and the Knesset Elections Law. The election
process is not limited to the formal meaning of the proceedings, but rather
has substantive, practical and conceptual implications. These
implications relate, inter alia, to the ability of the citizens to exert a
substantive, and not only formal, influence over the democratic process,
both as voters and as candidates for election.
The realization of the rights to vote and to be elected-especially in a
society that is polarized and torn on politic, ethnic, national, religious and
gender lines-is largely dependent on a deep and substantive
understanding of the right to dignity and the right to equality.
The principle of equality is one of the cornerstones of any democracy,
and essentially refers to equal treatment being accorded to all human
beings, without attaching importance to the various characteristics of
human beings, such as social status and family affiliation, sex, age,
religion, language, skin color and so on. The principle of equality
underlies liberal thought and forms the basis for additional democratic
principles.
It is possible to understand the increasing recognition given to the
centrality of the principle of equality, as part of the transition from a class
society where the individual is perceived as possessing a status from
birth-a status which frames his/her rights, duties, and expectations-to
a contractual society, where the individual must reach his/her position on
the basis of individual initiative. In order to enable real participation and
competition in the contractual decision-making process, 92 the legitimacy
of such a contractual society should depend on ensuring equal
opportunities to all its members.
Notwithstanding the recognition of the importance of the principle of
equality in Israeli law following the adoption of Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty, the right to equality was not expressly entrenched at
the constitutional level. Accordingly, as we shall see, the constitutional
protection of the right to equality in Israeli law is primarily a creature of
92.

Frances Raday, "On Equality," 24 MISHPATIM (THE LAw) 241, 245 (1994) (in

Hebrew).
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case law. In its rulings, the HCJ has referred to the principle of equality
as a supra principle, which is "the heart and soul of our whole
and infringement of which creates "a particularly
constitutional system"
93
feeling."
harsh
Like a number of other democratic principles, equality has a dual
meaning, one formal and the other substantive. The principle of formal
equality refers to the operation of the law by the courts in an impartial
manner and without distinction between litigants (equality before the
law). In contrast, the principle of substantive equality does not consider
only the equal operation of the law but rather the law itself (equality in
law). The principle of substantive equality was first recognized in a clear
and definitive manner in article 6 of the French Declaration of Human
and Civil Rights dated August 26, 1789, under which:
The law . . . must be the same for all, whether it protects or
punishes. All citizens, being equal in its eyes, shall be equally
eligible to all high offices, public positions and employments,
according to their ability,94and without other distinction than that of
their virtues and talents.
In modem constitutional and liberal thinking, the principle of equality
is not formal. It is a fundamental concept that embodies fairness, justice
and morality. There is no "pure" principle of equality. Equality, justice
and morality cannot be completely separated. Equality is a mixture of all
these concepts. Thus, for example, equality and equal opportunity may
actually be expressed by giving preference to persons bearing certain
characteristics who have suffered discrimination in the past and who are
now at an unequal starting point (affirmative action).
The principle of equality has been recognized in many human rights
documents 95 as well as in the British Mandate for Palestine. 96 Likewise,
in the Declaration of Establishment of the State of Israel, the founding
fathers promised that "Israel ... will ensure complete equality of social
rights to all its inhabitants, irrespective of religion, race or
and political
97
sex."
The early days of the State of Israel also witnessed the enactment of
various primary statutes providing protection for equality, such as the
93. HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance 23(1) PD 693 (Isr.).
94. See The French Declaration of Human and Civil Rights 1789.
95. See, e.g, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
96. British Mandate of Palestine arts. 2 & 15; Palestine Order-in-Council, arts. 17-19a
(1922) (restricting the legislative powers of the High Commissioner, in view of the requirement
that "no Ordinance may be passed which shall tend to discriminate in any way between the
inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language").
97. See supra note 41.
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Equal Rights for Women Law, 1951; Section 42(A) of the Employment
Service Law, 1959; and the Equal Opportunities at Work Law, 1988.98
This legislative protection may be found in the judicial presumption
whereby the purpose of legislation is to promote and maintain equality.
In other words, in order to contradict this presumption, express language
is required. For example, the Equal Rights for Women Law proclaims the
existence of a value which should properly encompass our entire legal
system. 99 Therefore, where this law is not expressly contradicted, an
interpretation of the law that is consistent with the principle of equality
between the sexes should be preferred.' 00
There is no dispute as to the importance, and even critical nature, of
the right to equality within a bill of rights, especially in democratic
regimes. Thus in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty bill, the right to
equality was included among the list of rights protected by the Basic
Law.' 0 ' However, due to opposition by the religious parties, the right to
equality was omitted from the final version of the Basic Law. This
opposition was due to the religious parties' concern that a constitutional
right to equality would lead to equal recognition of women, homosexuals,
and, even worse (in their eyes), the reform movement. Accordingly, in
order to preserve the status quo (at least formally) vis-6-vis the religious
parties, the Knesset deliberately waived the inclusion of the right to
equality within the Basic Law. Thus, at leastprimafacie, the arrangement
is a negative one. Nonetheless, a perusal of the Knesset records indicates
that some MKs-in their "constitutional" capacity-believed that it was
the HCJ that should eventually interpret the Basic Law and hold that
human dignity included the right to equality. In other words, the omission
of the right to equality in the Basic Law would not negate the protection
of this right within the framework of the right to dignity.
Either way, it should be noted that it is not possible to deny the
existence of constitutional protection of the principle of equality, as a
value and not as a right. This is true particularly in light of the addition
of a new Section 1 to the Basic Law, in 1994, according to which:
"Fundamental human rights in Israel ... shall be upheld in the spirit of
the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State
of Israel,"10 2 and in light of the language and purpose of Section IA of
the Basic Law, according to which: "The purpose of this Basic Law is to
protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the
98. The Book of Laws, no. 1240, (Mar. 3, 1988).
99. The Book of Laws, no. 82, (July 26, 1951).
100. HCJ 104/87 Nevo v. Nat'l Labor Court 44(4) PD 749, 764 (Isr.); HCJ 301/63 Schtreit
v. Chief Rabbi of Israel 18(1) PD 612 (Isr.).
101. See Yehudit Karp, Basic-Law: Human Dignity and Liberty: A Biography of PowerStruggles, 1 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL (Law & Governance) 323, 336 (1993) (in Hebrew).
102. Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 37, § 1.
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values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state."' 10 3 This
approach is based on a broad interpretation of the right to "human dignity
and liberty" and the reference to the principles of the Declaration of
Establishment. 0 4 This is because this approach accords supra legal
normative status to the principle of equality. 10 5 Yet, one may ask, what
connection does equality have to dignity?
Section 4 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty states: "All
persons are entitled to the protection of their life, body and dignity." 10 6 In
the past, consideration was often given to the nature of the right to dignity
as a framework right. As such, the right to dignity merely provided a
source of recognition of other basic rights, for example, the right to
freedom of expression. Both the legal literature and the rulings of the
Supreme Court expressed the view that the constitutional right to dignity
also embraced constitutional protection of the right to equality. In other
words, where primary legislation violates the right to equality, it must
meet the requirements of the limitation clause set out in Section 8 of the
Basic Law, otherwise, it would be unconstitutional.
It is permissible to contemplate a distinction between two individuals
based on relevant considerations but not on irrelevant ones. 10 7 The right
to equality and the right to dignity are closely related to each other. The
core meaning of the right to equality is that the social order must reflect
recognition of all human beings as equals. As such, the right to dignity
provides, at minimum, the means to attain equality. The core meaning of
the right to dignity is that which seeks to emphasize the treatment of a
person as an end in itself, and not as a means to achieve other goals. Use
of a person as a means is nothing but more refined language for describing
the humiliation and degradation of a man. The terms "degradation,"
"humiliation" and "dignity" are intertwined with the concept of
"equality." In the words of the philosopher Aristotle: "Democracies have
arisen from supposing that those who are equal in one thing are so in
every other circumstance."' 10 8 In the past, the Supreme Court of Israel
occasionally considered the question of recognizing the right to equality
within the boundaries of the right to dignity as a framework right (or
basket right). Much ink has been spilt on the nature of the right to dignity
as a basket right. As such, it encompasses many rights which are not
103. Id. § IA.
104. See supra note 41.
105. HCJ 453/94 Israel's Women Network v. Gov't of Israel 48(5) PD 501 (Isr.); HCJ
721/94 El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Danielowitz 48(5) PD 749 (Isr.).
106. Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 37, § 4.
107. FH 10/69 Boronowsky v. Chief Rabbi of Israel, 25(1) PD 7 (Isr.), and in the language
of Justice Or: "unlawful discrimination means different treatment of equals." See HCJ 678/88
Cfar Vradim v. Minister of Fin. 43(2) PD 501 (Isr.).
108. Aristotle, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (William Ellis trans. 1947).
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expressly referred to in the Basic Law. By its very nature, the right to
dignity also includes equality. The dignity, which is inviolable and is
entitled to protection, does not only embrace a person's good name, but
also his/her status as equal among equals. His/Her dignity is violated not
only through slander, insults or abuse but also by discrimination or
treatment of him/her in a biased, racist or demeaning way. Protection of
human dignity is also reflected in securing equal rights and preventing
any discrimination on grounds of sex, race, language, opinion, social
affiliation, family affiliation, marital status, ethnic origin and the like.
This deep understanding of the right to dignity and the right to equality
highlights the critical nature of the rights to vote and to be elected. The
latter are not only official state procedures expressed through the
participation or possibility of participation in the political game.
Recognition must be given to the capacity of the political process to have
a significant impact. This is particularly true in the case of a
representative parliamentary democracy based on compromises and
balances, as distinct from formal and technical dichotomies.
Violation of an individual's fundamental rights is serious in itself.
Violation of fundamental rights on a group or collective basis is even
more severe. Collective injury perpetuates a certain kind of inferiority,
one imposed by the discriminatory authority on the discriminated group.
Group discrimination perpetuates severe social stigmas, and entails the
humiliation and degradation of the individual members of the group
against whom discrimination is being shown. Group discrimination
illustrates the use of human beings as a tool to achieve other goals, more
than anything else does; a treatment that leads to acute harm to the dignity
of man.
III. FROM THE GENERAL TO THE PARTICULAR

This Article deals with the issue of the constitutionality of the laws on
referendum. In the earlier sections I laid the normative foundation of the
legal system and regime in the State of Israel, and it is within this
normative framework that I shall examine the constitutionality of the
Israeli laws on referendum.
A. Conceptualand IsraeliAspects of a Referendum
The existence of a mandatory referendum regime, as proposed by the
laws on referendum, subordinates governmental decisions and the will of
the legislature to the results of such referendum. Therefore, it has
numerous legal, statutory, constitutional, administrative, national,
international and political implications. Shmuel Saadia and Liav Orgad,
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in their comprehensive essay on referenda, addressed this issue in detail
and particularly discussed the considerations
militating against the
0 9
adoption of the institution of the referendum.1
A referendum, in relation to the question being posed, is a tool used
as a substitute for the legislature, particularly when it fetters the executive
branch and the legislative branch and is not merely a consultative
referendum, leaving the interpretation of the results to the legislature.
The existence of referenda weakens the power of the elected
government in that they indicate that the electorate does not trust the
government to make certain decisions. In addition, a referendum can be
skewed by the nature of the question and the imposition of limitations on
the scope of the response available to the voter.
Furthermore, considerable technical knowledge is required in order to
make informed decisions on a variety of issues on the public agenda,
knowledge which most of the public lacks, and for this reason alone, any
reached outcome could work out to be against the public interest.
A constitutional democratic regime, particularly in divided and
multicultural societies, is characterized as a substantive democracy (i.e.,
a regime that reflects the majority opinion, but at the same time protects
minority groups). In such a regime, acute importance attaches to the
governmental decision-making process led by the representative
parliamentary system. In the representative system, the executive and the
legislative branches have room to make decisions based on political
compromises or a desire to show tolerance towards vulnerable groups in
the society; namely, groups which are unable to express their wishes
through a built-in majority in the society.
In contrast, in a regime that incorporates referenda, the governmental
system is based on dichotomous decisions of "yes" or "no" ("for" or
"against") in relation to the question addressed directly to the public, on
a particular topic. Decisions by referenda are circumscribed, rigid and
irreversible, and embody the repugnant concept of formal democracy
which most of the modem substantive constitutional democracies in the
West have long abandoned.
Moreover, a referendum may be used as a political and legal tool to
exploit the democratic process, by way of formal democracy, while
ignoring the rights and interests of the minority, as well as oppressing the
rights of this minority, both as individuals and as a collective. A
referendum may reinforce the numerical inferiority of the minority and
even translate it into material and legal inferiority; that which deals a
mortal blow to the principle of equality before the law, and afortiori,the
principle of substantive equality."l° A referendum can create a tyranny of
109.
110.

SAADIA & ORGAD, supra note 18, at 56-79.

Cf
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the majority, and lead to the misuse of the democratic apparatus.
Elsewhere I wrote:
Constitutional democracy bears some unique features.
Constitutional democracy is not merely a representative system, it
is not only the voice of the majority, and it is not solely the voice
of the legislature. Constitutional democracy is a balancing system,
it is the voice of the majority but also the guard for minorities and
their human rights, and it is the voice of the legislature only when
it enacts laws in accordance with the fundamental highest
principles of the Law, namely, justice, reasonableness, and
proportionality. Constitutional democracy is not a melting
democracy, so-called defensive democracy, but still it is not a
suicide pact. Constitutional democracy is not a total system of
deprivation, 11
suppression, and criminal punishment, but a system
of tolerance. '
Referenda thus weaken the power of the Knesset and expose its
misuse. Referenda as a means of direct democracy are problematic
devices in a democratic society with ethnic nationalistic characteristics.
Use of referenda as a governmental process may turn the referenda into
effective barriers against the influence of the minority on the decisionmaking processes
and indeed remove any remaining influence over the
12
1
legislature.
Moreover, the referendum mechanism brings substantive acutely
disputed issues for final decision, while undermining social and public
stability and indeed potentially negating social cohesion. This is
particularly true in highly divisive societies, where often the absence of
decisions on such complex and sensitive issues-is the key to the
development of a political dialogue that allows balanced and considered
political decisions to be made. In the case of Ram Engineers and
ContractorsLtd., Justice Aharon Barak explained this point as follows:
Tolerance is a central value of public order. If every individual in
a democratic society would seek to fully satisfy his desires, society
would end up unable to fulfill even a few aspirations. In the natural
course of things, a healthy society is based on mutual concessions

(1993) (in Hebrew).
111. Mohammed S. Wattad, The Meaning of Wrongdoing-A Crime of Disrespecting the
Flag: Grounds for Preserving "National Unity"? 10 S.D. INT'L L.J. 5 (2008).
112. Amal Jamal, Direct Democracy, Ethnic Democracy and the Limits of Influence:
Referendum and the Palestiniansin Israel,in PHANTOM IN POLITICS: REFERENDA INISRAEL (Dana
Arieli-Gorowitz ed., Jerusalem: Magnes 2006) (in Hebrew).
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3

The importance of these comments is reinforced when considering
whether the purpose underlying the laws on referendum is a proper
purpose or not. In other words, a purpose may be considered improper if
it undermines the fabric of life and the stability of society. See also:
Democracy is based on tolerance... Indeed, tolerance constitutes
both an end and a means. It constitutes a social goal in itself, which
every democratic society should aspire to realize. It serves as a
means and a tool for balancing between other social goals and4
reconciling them, in cases where they conflict with one another."1
The ability of politicians to bypass parliament and appeal directly to
citizens, particularly in democratic regimes lacking a formal written
constitution, could allow a charismatic leader to present himself/herself
as someone who, contrary to the elected politicians, is carrying out the
"will of the People." The weakening of parliamentary institutions before
a deeply rooted democratic political tradition that has been formed is
dangerous and could lead to personalization of government.
B. The Referendum Law: Its Characteristics,Nature and Application
Israeli democracy has not implemented a referendum since 1948, even
though the demand to make use of this device for one-time decision
making purposes or as a permanent mechanism has occasionally been
voiced.
The use of the device of the referendum as a mechanism, which
subordinates the decisions of the Government and even the Knesset
decisions-whether in a general and sweeping manner or in relation to
concrete issues-however worthy it may be, touches upon the core of the
system of government in Israel. It would be appropriate, as we learned
from the Declaration of Establishment, quoted above, to determine this
matter within the context of a constitution or a constitutional legislation
such as Basic Law enactment.
Indeed, the electoral system in Israel is regulated by Section 4 of Basic
Law: The Knesset, as well as other constitutional provisions in the body
of this Basic Law. As noted, Section 4 of this Basic law (The Electoral
System) may only be varied by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the
MKs.
In support of this analysis it should be recalled that on May 28, 1995
113. CA 105/92 Ram Engineers and Contractors Ltd. v. Upper Nazareth Municipality, 47(5)
PD 189, 211 (Isr.).
114.

AHARON BARAK, THtE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 28 (2006).
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the Israeli Minister of Justice, at that time, Professor David Libai,
appointed an internal committee, headed by Deputy Attorney General
Shlomo Guberman, to prepare a draft law for a referendum on a specific
topic to be determined." 5 The committee report discussed, at length, the
difficulty of changing the electoral system through a referendum. This
difficulty ensued from the formal entrenchment provided by Section 4 of
Basic Law: The Knesset. In other words, in the committee's view, the
Knesset alone was competent to change the electoral system; the People
could not do so through a referendum. That is, Basic Law: The Knesset
could not be indirectly varied through a referendum,' 16 because the option
of a referendum regarding any change in the electoral system did not
appear within the language of Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.
Moreover, subjecting government decisions to referenda means
constricting the residual authority of the Government as anchored in
Section 32 of Basic Law: The Government; a constitutional legal norm
which is formally entrenched, and which cannot be varied save by a Basic
Law passed by a majority of the MKs (as required by Section 44 of this
Basic Law).
In any event, where the State of Israel wishes to hold a "referendum,"
as a positive binding device, it is incumbent upon it to do so through a
Basic Law, adopted by a majority of the MKs, both by virtue of Section
4 of Basic Law: The Knesset and in compliance with Section 44 of Basic
Law: The Government. This is because these are the two Basic Laws that
establish, inter alia, the principles of the regime and regulate the powers
of the two main branches of govemment in Israel. This is a fundamental
issue of the first order and certainly, not a technical one. As a matter of
principle, a change to the system of government, even without the explicit
language of Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset and Section 44 of Basic
Law: The Government, must be implemented through the enactment of
basic legislation.
Support exists for this view. In the Mizrachi Bank case itself, Justice
Cheshin addressed the question whether the Knesset is permitted to enact
an entrenchment provision that requires the approval of a particular
statutory amendment by means of a referendum. In his comments, he
avoided making a decision relative to the validity of such a provision, but
at the same time cast doubt on the Knesset's power to act in this way.'' 7
In this context, it is apt to quote again the remarks of Justice Aharon
Barak, in the Mizrachi Bank case:
Our political and legal culture is not based upon a special appeal
115. The State of Israel, Ministry of Justice, "Referendum - Committee Report" (in
Hebrew).
116.
117.

SAADIA&ORGAD,supranote 18, at 147.
Mizrachi Bank, CA 6821/93 (Isr.).
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to the People by means of a referendum. No referendum has taken
place in the past. Our political and legal culture is not built upon
"direct" democracy, but upon "representative" democracy. Our
political and legal culture also maintains that the appeal to the
People takes place in the context of the electionsfor the Knesset."'
A provision of this type was created in Section 3 of the Golan Heights
Entrenchment Law. It is worth emphasizing that Section 4 of this Law
stated that the provisions of Section 3 would commence only "on the
commencement of a Basic Law which will regulate the conduct of the
referendum." Clearly, the Knesset itself was aware of the normative
supra-statutory constitutional weight of the adoption of a governmental
system, conducted, inter alia, by means of a "referendum," and the
corresponding need to anchor this system in basic legislation, and not in
mere ordinary enactment.
However, and to the contrary, as we have witnessed in 2010, the
Knesset enacted the Referendum Law, as an ordinary law, rather than a
Basic Law. It was then-as I view it-that the petition before the HCJ
and its evolvement during the first two hearing sessions that forced, in
2014, the Knesset to alter its initial ordinary legislation to a Basic Law
enactment, as crystalized in the shape of the Referendum Basic Law.
In my opinion, by enlarging the judicial panel and issuing a decree
nisi, the Court indicated to the Knesset and the Government that it is
ready to exert its power ofjudicial review against the constitutionality of
the Referendum Law, thus declaring its form of enactment as
unconstitutional.
There cannot be any other explanation to the Knesset's shifting moods
other than the one mentioned above. Especially, due to the fact that by
legislating the Referendum Basic Law, the Knesset acted contradictory
to its official position before the Court, at the time the petition was
pending before the Court. If the Knesset was so serious about its
arguments, I see no reason why it did not take the legal challenge
seriously all the way until the final line, hence, allowing the Court to
make its legal and judicial decision on the arguments spread out through
the petition.
C. Referendum and its Impact on the Issue of the Golan Heights
In this context, it is necessary to briefly examine the Golan Heights
Entrenchment Law, if only because of its importance to the issue at hand.
The Golan Heights Law, 1981 (Golan Heights Law) was enacted by the
Knesset on December 14, 1981, and provided that "The law, jurisdiction
118.

Id. Judgment of Justice Aharon Barak 149 (emphasis added).
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and administration of the State shall apply to the Golan Heights." The
public perceived the law as annexing the Golan Heights and making it
part of the territory of the State of Israel. This was also the way the law
was referred to by its opponents. However, the Government deliberately
avoided using the word "annexation."
The law led to fierce international criticism directed against Israel, and
no country in the world, including the United States of America, ever
recognized this law. The U.N. Security Council even responded by
passing Resolution 497, thus declaring that this "annexation" was
"without international legal effect." The practical consequences of this
law are few. This is because, since the enactment of the law, many
governments in Israel have conducted, overt or covert, political
negotiations with Syria; negotiations which reached an advanced stage,
and even discussed the return of the Golan Heights, in whole or in part,
to Syria.
In 1999, the Knesset passed the Golan Heights Entrenchment Law,
according to which a government decision to give up territory of the State
would require the approval of a majority of the Knesset members (61 or
more) and a majority of the voters in a referendum-this would apply
immediately upon the adoption of a Basic Law regulating the same; basic
legislation.
In2010 the Referendum Law was passed, in essence amending the
Golan Heights Entrenchment Law, and subordinating the decisions of the
executive branch regarding cessation of the application of the law,
jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel to the "territory"-not only to Knesset approval but also to the approval of the People, within
the framework of a referendum.19 The Golan Heights Entrenchment Law
was basically amended by the Referendum Law, thus replacing the
requirement for the adoption of a referendum mechanism using basic
legislation (under the original Golan Heights Entrenchment Law) with
the actual adoption
of the referendum mechanism through ordinary
20
legislation alone.'
A perusal of the provisions of the Referendum Law reveals that it
relates to the adoption of a referendum, which binds the legislature and
the executive authority; and that as a corollary, in absence of the final and
binding seal of approval of the People, no legal or administrative
significance attaches to the decisions of these two governmental
branches, a seal of approval which may only be obtained through a
referendum.
However, it should be noted that in my view the provisions of the
119.
applies.
120.

The territory to which the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel
See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, at 122.
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Referendum Law contain a self-neutralization mechanism. That is
because according to this law it will not be necessary to refer to a
referendum where the Government's decision is approved by 80 MKs.
Namely, the above-mentioned law requires the reference to a referendum
only in case the Knesset confirms the Government's decision by votes of
61 MKs. It is remarkable that should the Knesset reject the Government's
to the People is required (i.e., no referendum
decision, then no reference
121
would be exerted).
The Referendum Law establishes a concrete arrangement for elections
to the legislative branch-elections for all intents and purposes-in
relation to a specific issue, with all that implies in procedural and
substantive terms.
Furthermore, a note shall be made that the Referendum Law lacks
constitutional logic insofar as it requires a special majority of 61 MKs in
order to refer the Government's decision to exert a referendum, while it
finds it sufficient that a simple majority of participants in the referendum
confirm the Government's decision. This is being mentioned especially
due to the importance of the topic referred to by the referendum. If the
issue put forward for the public's decision is so significant, then a special
majority should have been sought.
D. The Referendum Law. UnconstitutionalVariation of
Basic Legislation
The Referendum Law embraces a complete basic and fundamental
electoral order-which I contend is improper-within the framework of
an ordinary law. It does so despite the clear and explicit intention of the
Knesset, as revealed in the original version of the Golan Heights
Entrenchment Law of 1999, despite the judicial determinations in the
Mizrachi Bank case, 12 2 including the subsequent binding rulings of the
HCJ, and in spite of the clarity and specificity of Section 4 of Basic Law:
The Knesset and Section 44 of Basic Law: The Government, which refer
explicitly to the need for Basic Law enactment when seeking to change
the electoral system or modify (expand or narrow) the powers of the
executive authority.
Above all, and in addition, by reading the latter above-mentioned
Basic Laws, it becomes clear that the concept of a referendum is foreign
to both of them. It follows, therefore, that in essence, according to its
provisions, the Referendum Law limits the powers of the executive
authority, including its residual authority in particular, and explicitly
alters the system of government and the electoral system in Israel.
121.
122.

Referendum Law, supra note 3, § 4(2)(b).
Mizrachi Bank, CA 6821193 (Isr.).
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To make the argument clearer, time then to emphasize, in further
details, how the initial Referendum Law materially changes other
constitutional provisions in Basic Law: The Knesset. To elaborate on this
point, allow me to provide the following examples:
First, the Referendum Law creates another source of authority for
"dissolving" the Knesset, in the sense that it compels an election-albeit
in an ad hoc manner-including all the procedures involved therein.
Second, the Referendum Law affects the continuity of the term of the
Knesset, though Section 8 of Basic Law: The Knesset explicitly provides
for a term of four years. Thus, in absence of any of the grounds for
shortening the term of the Knesset, as stipulated in Basic Law: The
Knesset, there is no statutory ground which would allow even the
temporary forfeiture of the Knesset's term of office or the continuity of
its decision-making process, for even a single hour. Clearly, there is also
no ground, under Basic Law: The Knesset, for allowing a change in the
election date as prescribed in Section 9 of Basic Law: The Knesset,
including the relevant provisions for early elections or postponed
elections.
Third, the Referendum Law materially varies Basic Law: The Knesset
with regard to the rights to vote and to be elected. 123 This is because these
two rights are not formal in the sense that they allow the implementation
of the rights to vote or to be elected. Rather, these are substantive rights,
which are realized in accordance with the dates and grounds explicitly
stated in Basic Law: The Knesset. In this context, it must be reemphasized
that the right to vote and the right to be elected are founded on, and as
part of, the complete mechanism of election law established by Basic
Law: The Knesset and the Knesset Elections Law (i.e., insofar as these
relate to the fulfillment of the right to influence the democratic process),
whether as a voter or as a candidate for election. The latter two players,
by virtue of the provisions of Basic Law: The Knesset and the Knesset
Elections Law, both in relation to the dates for holding elections, and in
relation to the grounds on which the term of the elected Knesset may be
shortened or extended, have a reliance interest. Basic Law: The Knesset
does not contain provisions allowing for the creation of a temporary
Knesset convened by the People, which can reach decisions that override
the decisions of the existing elected Knesset.
To this extent, it is not constitutionally preferable then for the Knesset
to have enacted the Referendum Basic Law; it must have done so from
the beginning. This is what Israel's constitutional structure requires. It is
not by chance, therefore, that the Knesset enacted the Referendum Basic
Law shortly before the third hearing session of the petition before the
HCJ.
123.

Knesset, supra note 51, §§ 5-6.
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E. The Referendum Law and its Impact on Basic Law: Jerusalem,
Capitalof Israel
Since 1948, the legal and international status of Jerusalem, and more
specifically of East Jerusalem, has been complicated and obscure.
According to the U.N. General Assembly's Resolution 181, quoted in the
Declaration of Establishment, international territory, which would
include Jerusalem, was supposed to have been established. This
resolution was not accepted; nonetheless, much of the world continues to
see it as reflecting the correct legal position and refers to the legal status
of Jerusalem accordingly.
In 1949, the State of Israel declared Jerusalem to be the capital of the
State of Israel. Since the Six Day War in 1967, Israel has controlled all
the territory of Jerusalem, and on July 30, 1980-when Basic Law:
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel was adopted-the entire city of Jerusalem
became an integral part of the State of Israel by virtue of Israeli law. In
response, on August 20, 1980 the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 478 calling for the cancellation of this Basic Law.
Under the Oslo Accords, signed on September 13, 1993, the final
status of East Jerusalem would be determined at a later date following
negotiations between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Apart from being a Basic Law, and as such possesses supra-legal
constitutional status, Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, contains a
formal entrenchment provision in the form of Section 7, which states:
"Clauses 5 and 6 shall not be modified except by a basic law passed by a
majority of the members of the Knesset." Sections 5 of the Basic Law
states: "The jurisdiction of Jerusalem includes, as pertaining to this Basic
Law, among others, all of the area that is described in the appendix of the
proclamation expanding the borders of municipal Jerusalem beginning.
June 2 8 th, 1967, as was given according to the Cities' Ordinance."
Section 6 of the Basic Law states: "No authority that is stipulated in the
law of the State of Israel or of the Jerusalem Municipality may be
transferred either permanently or for an allotted period of time to a
foreign body, whether political, governmental or to any other similar type
of foreign body." It seems, therefore, that the Referendum Law may have
serious legal and constitutional implications regarding the legal status of
East Jerusalem, within the framework of a future political settlement with
the Palestinian Authority. The legal framework prescribed by the
Referendum Law materially changes the provisions of Section 7 of Basic
Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, which clearly requires that such a
change be made by a Basic Law enactment rather than an ordinary
legislation. Therefore, the Knesset had no discretion in choosing between
ordinary law and Basic Law legislation. It should have chosen the latter
option from the very beginning. Here we are again; it is not out of free
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choice that the Knesset ultimately made its mind in enacting the
Referendum Basic Law. It was, in my modest view, a direct consequence
of the petition and its evolvement before the HCJ.
F. Interim Conclusion
In essence, the Referendum Law enables the current parliamentary
majority in the Israeli Knesset to misuse its power by fettering the
legislature and the executive authority in the future. Fettering that, as
mentioned, should be confined to basic legislation and not allowed
through ordinary legislation; fettering that has no moral, legal,
constitutional or historical justification. This is particularly true in light
of the fact that the application of the law, jurisdiction and administration
of the State of Israel to the Golan Heights and to East Jerusalem was not
made by way of a referendum, and therefore there is no room to revoke
the application of law, jurisdiction and administration to these areas by
way of a referendum. All this is true, moreover, in view of the historic,
political and international-diplomatic and legal--conflict regarding the
legal status of the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem.
Thus, the Referendum Law materially changes fundamental
provisions in Basic Law: The Knesset, Basic Law: The Government, and
Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel. The Referendum Law was not
initially passed in accordance with the Israeli constitutional structure,
namely through basic legislation, and therefore it was a "bad law." Yet,
four years after the original enactment of the 2010 law, the Knesset,
luckily, regained its composure. However, better late than never. To this
extent the Knesset corrected then a fundamental constitutional flaw, that
otherwise would have required the intervention of the HCJ-a judicial
review that the Knesset succeeded to avoid at the last minute of the
judicial hearing before the Court.
The question becomes then: does the latter legislative amendment
fully resolve the constitutional flaws in the Referendum Law? In my
view, the Referendum Law is substantively flawed as it unlawfully
violates fundamental constitutional human rights. Before approaching
this issue, a note ought to be made.
The arguments at this level were not discussed before the HCJ, since
already in the first hearing session of the petition, and in light of the
Court's remarks, I have agreed to limit the scope of the petition,
particularly given that no actual referendum was taking place at the time
the petition was heard by the Court.
This way or the other, and for the sake of academic research, I would
like to provide the readers with my arguments in this context.
G. The Referendum Law: UnconstitutionalViolation of Protected
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FundamentalRights
The Referendum Law, including the governmental mechanism
contained therein, violates protected constitutional rights. These
protected fundamental rights include the right to dignity and the right to
equality (equality before the law and the principle of substantive equality)
under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,1 24 and the right to vote
and the right to be elected under Basic Law: The Knesset. 125 These rights
are violated by the Referendum Law not in accordance with the terms of
the limitation clause set out in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,' 26
limitation 127 clause applied in
and not in accordance with the judicial
1 28
relation to Basic Law: The Knesset.
1. The Right to Vote and the Right to be Elected
According to Section 5 of Basic Law: The Knesset, the right to vote
in elections to the Knesset is given to every person who meets the
following cumulative criteria: he/she is (a) an Israeli citizen; (b) 18 years
old or older; and (c) the court has not deprived him/her of this right by
virtue of any law. The right to be elected to the Knesset is given to any
person who meets the following cumulative criteria: he/she is (a) an
Israeli citizen; (b) included in a list of candidates submitted by a party;
and (c) on the date of filing the list of candidates he/she is twenty-one
years of age or over.
The election process is not limited to the formal meaning of the
process, but has substantive, practical and conceptual implications. These
implications relate, inter alia, to the Israeli citizens' ability to influence
the democratic process, both as voters and as possible candidates for
election. A citizen has a reliance interest in relation to the date of holding
the election for the Knesset as well as in relation to the full term of the
serving Knesset, subject, as noted, to the grounds listed in Basic Law:
The Knesset 129 regarding the extension or shortening of the term of the
Knesset.
Violations of these rights, according to the mechanism outlined in the
Referendum Law, 130 must be carried out in compliance with the
constitutional standards set out in the judicial limitation clause, before
such violations can be deemed constitutional. In absence of such
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 37, §§ 2 & 4.
Knesset, supranote 51, §§ 5 & 6.
Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 37, § 8.
See supra note 36.
See supra note 51.
See id.
The Book of Laws, No. 2263 (Nov. 28, 2010).
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compliance, the scourge of unconstitutionality taints these violations.
This is especially true in light of the understanding of the referendum
mechanism as an apparatus for establishing a temporary superior Knesset
(superior to the serving Knesset).
The Referendum Law violates the integrity of the preceding election
process by virtue of which the current Knesset serves. It also violates the
right to vote and the right to be elected of Israeli citizens who wish to
participate in the decision-making process on crucial matters in an
organized and established manner, within the framework of the classical
procedure of elections to the Knesset-the manner prescribed in Basic
Law: The Knesset.131
Moreover, the right to vote and the right to be elected are derived from
the representative electoral system used in Israel, both
by virtue of Basic
1 32
Law: The Knesset and the Knesset Elections Law.
This broad and substantive understanding of the two rights support a
perception of the governmental process as a representative process, which
encompasses decisions based on balances rather than on dichotomies. In
contrast, the Referendum Law actually adopts a dichotomous approach
of "yes or no" and "for or against." The latter approach is foreign to the
Israeli electoral system and, as such, violates the right to vote and the
right to be elected.
2. The Arab Minority in Israel: The Right to Dignity,
the Right to
133
Law
Referendum
the
and
Equality,
Another aspect of the violation of the right to vote and the right to be
elected relates to the collective rights of the Arab minority in Israel,
especially, but not only, the residents of the Golan Heights and East
Jerusalem.
The Referendum Law entrenches the Arab collective's status as a
minority in the State of Israel and, as a result, sweepingly, technically and
formally prevents the Arab citizens from engaging in genuine and
influential participation in the electoral process, either as voters or as
candidates for election. This is because a national ethnic minority is best
able to exert its influence in a representative democracy by allowing the
public's representatives to show the necessary flexibility and discretion
to engage in political and principled compromises. In other words,
flexibility that allows the management of a constitutional democratic
society (substantive democracy), and that which rejects the validity of a
formal numerical democracy.
131. See supra note 51.
132. The Book of Laws, No. 556 (Apr. 14, 1969).
133. See generally Priscilla F. Gunn, Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and
Minority Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN.; J. U"n. & CONTEMP. L. 135 (1981).
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The Referendum Law creates a regime of formal democracy, which
implements the rights of the Arab minority in Israel to vote and be elected
in a completely technical manner, but does not grant this minority a
genuine opportunity to influence the election process. This is because the
Referendum Law creates a regime of "yes or no," that negates the
possibility of compromises and balances. In essence, the Referendum
Law perpetuates the numerical inferiority of the Arab minority in Israel,
and creates serious concern that the formal power of the referendum may
be abused. This should not be the way of substantive democracy.
Substantive democracy protects the rights of minorities and prevents
abuse on their part.
The Referendum Law significantly erodes the ability of the Arab
minority in Israel to exert real and representative influence-enabling
balances and compromises-in the political process, including the
political decision-making process in Israel. Thus, the Referendum Law
violates the right of the Arab minority in Israel to formal and substantive
equality relative to the Jewish citizens of Israel. The Arab Minority's
right to equality is violated by the Referendum Law's attitude toward the
Arab minority, which fosters a means to achieve another purpose-the
nature of which will be examined below. Regardless of how greatly this
purpose may be justified, the very use of the Arab minority as a means,
based on its ethnic national character, is humiliating and degrading, and
consequently breaches the dignity of the Arab minority.
Nevertheless, and above all, the Referendum Law is nothing but a
story of irony, for it aims at determining the future of the residents of East
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, by a referendum, in which these
residents are not allowed to participate in, for they are not allowed, in the
first place, to take part in the elections to the Knesset-neither as voters
nor as candidates.
3. The Referendum Law and the Constitutionality of the Violation of
Human Rights: Analysis of the Terms of the Limitation Clause
When a petitioner challenges the constitutionality of a statue, the
government bears the burden of establishing that the statute is
constitutional under the limitation clause. 134 Nonetheless, I shall refer to
134. Compare the debate on this issue: See (1) AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY IN LAW,
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND ITS LIMITATIONS 529-31 (2010) (in Hebrew); (2)

HCJ 6055/95 Zemach v. Minister of Def. 53(5) PD 241, at 269 [1999] (Isr.); (3) HCJ 8150/98
Jerusalem Arts Theater v. Minister of Labour 54(4) PD 443, at 445 (Isr.); (4) HCJ 366/03
Commitment to Peace & Soc. Justice Movement v. Minister of Fin. 60(3) PD 464 (Isr.); (5) HCJ
8035/07 Eliahu v. Gov't of Israel [2008] (Isr.) (Published in Nevo on Mar. 21, 2008); (6) HCJ
124/09 Dawiyat v. Minister of Def. [2009] (Isr.) (Published in Nevo on Mar. 18, 2009); (7) HCJ
1993/03 Movement for Quality in Gov't v. Prime Minister, 57(6) PD 817 [2003] (Isr.).
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the requirements of the limitation clause, including the subtests of the
requirement of proportionality contained in that clause.
A constitutional democracy is characterized by the fact that it is not
sufficient for lawful consent to be given to a violation of a constitutional
right. Legality is insufficient. The violation of a constitutional right must
be supported by a material and legitimate justification. An element of
legitimacy is required. One characteristic of this explicit requirement is a
worthy goal; another is that the means used to achieve that goal do not
impair the constitutional right beyond a proper extent.
Constitutional rights are so unique, inter alia, for it may only be
violated for the attainment of objectives, which can morally justify a
violation of the constitutional right. Such an objective is derived from the
values on which society is based (i.e., democratic values in a
constitutional democracy,135 and in the State of Israel, as a Jewish and
democratic state,' 36 these are its values).
The Mizrachi Bank case considered the general standard applied in
Israeli law when determining whether the purpose under consideration is
proper or not: "the purpose fits if it is intended to fulfill important social
goals for the establishment of a social framework that recognizes the
constitutional importance of human rights 138and the need to protect
them."' 137 It was further held in that case that:
a purpose that is positive from the point of view of human rights
and the values of society, including the purpose of establishing a
reasonable and fair balance between the rights of different People
who hold interests that are sometimes inconsistent with each other.
A proper purpose is one that creates a foundation for living
together, even if it entails a compromise in the area of granting
optimal rights to each and every individual, or if it serves interests
that are essential to the preservation of the state and society.
The declared subjective purpose, and indeed the objective and implied
purpose, of the Referendum Law is to subordinate government decisions
not only to the approval of the Knesset but also to the approval of the
People, insofar as the decisions concern the application of the law,
jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel to certain areas, such
as the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem.
As legitimate as this purpose can be, it is, in my view, improper. It
undermines the validity of the election to the Knesset as a result of which
the current Knesset serves, and violates the right to vote and the right to
135.

SAADIA&ORGAD, supra note 18, at 125.

136.
137.
138.

BARAK,supra note 114, at 295.
Mizrachi Bank, CA 6821/93; Judgment of Justice Aharon Barak, at 435.
Id., Judgment of Chief Justice Meir Shamgar, at 342.
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be elected of Israeli citizens who wish to take part in the critical decisionmaking process in the established classical election process, namely,
elections held in accordance with the constitutional criteria set out in
Basic Law: The Knesset and the Knesset Elections Law.
Political compromise is a preferable way to make decisions on
complex and weighty issues such as the borders of the State, national
identity and constitutional rules. In contrast to compromise, a referendum
fosters the illusion that there is a kind of legitimate political knife that
cuts one way or another. Consideration of problems in this 'black and
white' way, confronting "justice" with "injustice" or "truth" with "lies,"
in terms of the majority versus the minority, 39is foreign to the spirit of
democracy, and afortiori,liberal democracy.'
Moreover, where issues are complex from a legal, national and
international point of view, such as that relating to the Golan Heights and
East Jerusalem, it would seem that using the device of a referendum
would only deepen the existing chasms in society in general, and on this
specific issue, in particular, rather than bridge them.
The mechanism of the referendum results in substantive controversial
issues being decided with finality, in a manner that undermines social and
public stability and impairs social cohesion. This is particularly relevant
in the case of the State of Israel, which is divided, and where often the
absence of decisions on these substantive, complex and sensitive issues
is the key to the development of a political dialogue that allows balanced
and considered political decisions to be made.
Over the years, the HCJ has pursued a consistent policy of refraining
from ruling on the legal status of the Golan Heights-the essence of the
Referendum Law-leaving this issue open, as far as possible, to the
interpretation of the relevant national and international decision
makers. 140 In this context, it is worth quoting the words of Justice Aharon
Barak, in the Abu Salah case:
By virtue of the Golan Heights Law all the legal norms applicable
in the country are applied to the Golan Heights, in such manner
that where, in any statute, the words "Israel" or the "State" or the
"State of Israel," are used the Golan Heights shall also be implied
...there is no doubt that the purpose of the legislation - and the
language of the provision - is to equate the Golan Heights, with
regard14to
law, jurisdiction, and administration, to the State of Israel
1
itself.

139.

Yaron Ezrachi, Arguments againstthe Use of a Referendum in the Israeli Democracy,

in DANA ARIELI-HOROWITZ, REFERENDA IN ISRAEL 59 (1993) (in Hebrew).
140. SAADIA& ORGAD, supranote 18, at 291.

141.

HCJ 205/82 Abu Salah v. Minister of Interior 37(2) PD 718, at 720-21 (Isr.).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

43

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 2
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27

In a young and inexperienced democracy, such as that of the State of
Israel, we must avoid creating centers of authority outside the institutions
of the legislative, executive and judicial branches, and the political
framework of the parties. Such centers of authority may tempt
irresponsible political entities to harm the status of the legislature or the
government, in a manner that endangers the accepted democratic political
processes. A referendum can undermine the political stability of the
democratic system rather than strengthen it.
Moreover, the purpose of the Referendum Law negates the possibility
of creating potential critical balances that are needed in order to deem the
law's purpose as worthy. Democracy, particularly of the liberal kind, is
not based only on the principles of the People's sovereignty and majority
rule. A democratic regime also includes principles of pluralism,
protection of minority rights, consensus and compromise. Naturally, we
must accept the view that decisions in a democracy should be made by "a
government consisting of representatives," both in view of the size of
modem democratic societies and because of the complex nature of the
issues that demand resolution. This is also the case in Israel.
From this perspective, the referendum comes across as a populist
device, which may not only undermine representative democracy and its
institutions, but also divide the complex fabric of Israel's democratic and
multi-cultural society.' 42 The society in the State of Israel is subject to
conflict between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority. In this
situation, a referendum-cutting across and dividing the majority from
the minority based on national identity-is dangerous to society and to
the democratic state. This situation encourages the use of the referendum
as a means for conducting narrow nationalist policies under the guise of
democracy.
Even if I assume that the violation of fundamental rights is made for
a proper purpose, in accordance with the values of the State of Israel as a
Jewish and democratic state, I must still consider the proportionality of
the violation. If the harm is disproportionate, the Referendum Law is, a
priori, unconstitutional.
The requirement for proportionality consists of three subtests: (a) the
rational connection test: the existence of a rational connection between
the means chosen and the purpose that the legislature seeks to achieve
through this measure; (b) the necessity test: the existence of a means
which causes the least harm to the protected basic right; and (c) the test
of proportionality in the narrow sense: balancing benefits.
Even if I assume that there is a rational connection between the means

142. Dana Blander & Gideon Rahat, Referendum: Myth and Reality (position paper of the
Israel Democracy Institute) (vol. 20) 55 (2000) (in Hebrew).
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43
(the Referendum Law) and the purpose for which this law was enacted, 1
the means that was selected is not the least drastic in terms of the violation
of the protected fundamental rights in question. An alternative means was
the rules of Basic
available, namely, early elections in accordance with
144
Law.
Elections
Knesset
the
and
Law: the Knesset
It should be emphasized that underlying the necessity test is the
concept that legislative measures are needed only if it is not possible to
achieve the legislative objective by other hypothetical means that comply
with the requirement of a rational connection with equal or greater
and which may cause a lesser harm to the constitutional
intensity,
145
rights.
Further, even if one assumes that the Referendum Law is a less
harmful measure, a balance must still be drawn between the benefits
ensuing from the implementation of the purpose and the resulting harm
to the constitutional right. 146 This is because the measure established by
from,
the law must create a proper relationship between the benefit 1gained
47
right.
human
constitutional
the
to
and the scope of the harm
In light of the broader above detailed considerations, militating
against the institution of the referendum, the harm to protected
constitutional rights resulting from the operation of the mechanisms
under the Referendum Law far exceeds the practical usefulness in
complying with this law.

IV. INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION: THE REFERENDUM
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE

"Incidentally, in this context there are those who believe that it would
be inappropriate to hand over certain issues to the general public for
decision - unlike general decisions, such as the adoption of a constitution
- by way of a referendum."' 48 The electoral system in Israel is a
democratic parliamentary system of representative government. 149 Thus,
according to constitutional legal norms prescribed in this context, as the
People do not have power to decide issues on the agenda of the executive
or legislative branch through a referendum.
In other words, the People do not have a right to engage in a
143.

See generally BARAK, supra note 110, at 289-388.

144.

The Book of Laws, no. 556 (Apr. 14, 1969).

145. HCJ 8276/05 Adala-The Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights v. Minister of Def.
(published in Nevo, on Dec. 12, 2006) (Isr.); Judgment of Chief Justice Aharon Barak 12.
146. See BARAK, supra note 110, at 419-21. For the general proposition that when deciding
domestic issues, judges should balance the public interest and individual human rights.
147. HCJ 1030/99 Oron v. Speaker of the Knesset 56(3) PD 640, at 668 (Isr.).
148. RuBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 14, at 163-64.
149. See Knesset, supra note 51, § 4.
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"referendum," and in any event the Knesset does not have a mandate to
pass legislation providing for formal entrenchment which is reflected in
the existence of a referendum. Only the Knesset, as a constitutive, and
not as a legislative body, is competent to change the electoral system and
not the People through the device of a referendum. Put differently, it is
not possible to vary Basic Law: The Knesset indirectly by means of
referenda' 50 as, according to the language of Section 4 of Basic Law: The
Knesset, it is not possible to hold referenda to change the electoral
system.
To this extent, the Knesset's ultimate decision, in 2014, to incorporate
the referendum's concept in a Basic Law was not out of generosity, nor
was it because the Knesset finally got convinced that this is the only right
way to properly act, but rather because the HCJ gave enough bold
hints, 15 1 during the hearing sessions of the petition before it, that as it
stood then, and in the absence of a Basic Law legislature, a constitutional
problem calls upon judicial review. This becomes evident by the decision
to enlarge the judicial panel, sitting in the petition, to seven judges,
152
already after the first hearing session, as well as to issue a decree nisi.
The Referendum Law materially modifies the system of government
of the State of Israel, and as a corollary materially modifies Basic Law:
The Knesset, Basic Law: The Government, and Basic Law: Jerusalem,
Capital of Israel. It does so by significantly eroding the foundations of
the powers of the Knesset as the sole legislature of the State of Israel, as
well as, inter alia, the residual authority of the executive branch. As
explained, such
modifications can only be performed by means of basic
153
legislation.
This way or the other, in a democratic regime premised on the
principle of the separation of powers, where the political authority is
empowered to determine policy and the implementation of its policy in
the political, military, economic, and social arenas, it is of paramount
importance to preserve the power and status of the political authority. The
creation and modification of the political culture should be, first and
foremost, the province of the political forces themselves.
Even if the Knesset would have had a mandate to adopt basic
legislation enabling formal entrenchment expressed through the holding
of a referendum-as it ultimately did in 2014-such power would be
limited if abused. 1 54 The application of the law, jurisdiction, and
administration of the State of Israel to the Golan Heights and East
Jerusalem was not made by way of a referendum and therefore should not
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

SAADIA & ORGAD, supra note 18, at 147.
See supra note 4.
Id.
See Mizrachi Bank, CA 6821/93.
RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supranote 14, at 122.
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be annulled by way of a referendum. The existence of the historic,
political, international, diplomatic, and legal dispute in relation to the
Golan Heights and East Jerusalem support this view.
The Referendum Law strikes a mortal blow to the principle of the rule
of law, both formal and substantive. The rule of law is the foundation
upon which the Basic Laws of the State of Israel rest; particularly those
dealing with the establishment of its parliamentary, executive, and
judicial regime.
In light of the delicate constitutional fabric of the State of Israel, the
institution of the referendum can be a valid and legitimate solution only
in relation to the question of the need for the establishment of a formal
written and orderly constitution for the State of Israel.
Either way, a constitutional legislation that incorporates the idea of
referendum as a binding tool does not cure the constitutional deficiencies
of such legislation. This is because it violates fundamental constitutional
rights, in general, and others of the Arab minority in Israel, in particular.
These rights concern the right to vote and the right to be elected, and the
right to dignity and the right to equality with regard to the rights to vote
and be elected. Worse, the Referendum Law ignores the constitutional
rights of Israel's Arab residents of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
They are not full citizens of Israel but only permanent residents and, as
such, they have no right to vote, neither for the Knesset nor in a
referendum. This is an awkward legal and constitutional situation,
especially given that the Referendum Law primarily affects them.
I am aware that even constitutional rights are not absolute, and that as
such they can be violated by the governmental branches. However, when
this happens, such violation must meet the requirements set forth by the
formula as drafted in the limitation clause of Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty. This has not been the case for the Referendum Law.
Therefore, the Referendum Law is unconstitutional, because it is
completely contrary to written and unwritten binding supra-legal
constitutional norms as well as to legal rulings possessing a supra-legal
constitutional nature.
Finally, it is valuable to quote the remarks of the founder of the
political vision of the State of Israel, Theodor Herzl, in his work "The
Jewish State":
[A] settling of questions by the referendum to be an unsatisfactory
procedure, because there are no simple political questions which
can be answered merely by Yes and No. The masses are also more
prone, even than Parliaments, to be led away by heterodox
opinions and to be swayed by vigorous ranting. It is impossible to
formulate a wise internal or external policy in a popular
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